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--- pgpfan:forwarding [2022/01/07 12:58] – Ambiguous grammer. b.walzer
+++ pgpfan:forwarding [2023/06/26 15:31] (current) – [Fixes] Typo b.walzer
@@ Line 70: / Line 70: @@
 The article suggests a couple of ways to prevent surreptitious forwarding and I have run across another proposal that was probably made after the paper was published. All work by linking the destination of the encryption with the signature somehow. The ultimate intent seems to be to break the signature if the destination of the encryption changes. This does not strike me as a very good approach.
-Where we used to have a simple user education problem understandable by most anyone, we now have a difficult documentation problem that involves an obscure technical element. That is is assuming that it is even possible for the user to determine what happened to cause their signature to break. Unencrypted but signed messages would inexplicably not have this protection available and so this would have to be documented in a useful way to the user as well.
+Where we used to have a simple user education problem understandable by most anyone, we now have a difficult documentation problem that involves an obscure technical element. That is assuming that it is even possible for the user to determine what happened to cause their signature to break. Unencrypted but signed messages would inexplicably not have this protection available and so this would have to be documented in a useful way to the user as well.
 The user no longer is allowed to choose if they want their signature to include the destination of the message. This seems disrespectful to the user.