pgpfan:forward_secrecy
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pgpfan:forward_secrecy [2020/07/14 16:45] – [Forward Secrecy] Better organization b.walzer | pgpfan:forward_secrecy [2020/07/14 17:51] – The major rewrite b.walzer | ||
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======Forward Secrecy====== | ======Forward Secrecy====== | ||
- | The PGP protocol is sometimes criticized because it lacks a feature called [[wp> | + | The PGP protocol is sometimes criticized because it lacks a feature called [[wp> |
- | Some process is used to come up with a temporary key known only to you and your correspondent (e.g. [[wp> | + | Some process is used to come up with a temporary key known only to you and your correspondent (e.g. [[wp> |
The first important point is that forward secrecy depends on the integrity of the encryption. If someone manages to break the encryption on your old messages they will still get access to them. | The first important point is that forward secrecy depends on the integrity of the encryption. If someone manages to break the encryption on your old messages they will still get access to them. | ||
- | The second important point comes from the first. Since forward secrecy depends on the integrity of the encryption it will only be superior | + | The second important point comes from the first. Since forward secrecy depends on the integrity of the encryption it will only be superior in the case where someone gets access to your private key information. For the end to end encryption case that will mean compromising an end device. |
- | =====Message Archives===== | + | If someone compromises your end device then they have access to whatever you have access to. They can acquire any passwords or passphrases with a key logger. They can see what you see on the screen either at the character stream level or with screenshots. There are two important implications here: |
- | If someone gains access to one of your private PGP encryption keys then they can decrypt all the archived email that was originally sent to the associated identity. A system with forward secrecy | + | * They get access to any saved messages. For forward secrecy to work you must give up message archiving. |
+ | * They get access to any transferred messages. Forward secrecy is of no value after a compromise. | ||
- | There is no practical security difference between PGP and a system | + | Forward secrecy requires an end to end, bidirectional communications channel to establish a temporary key. So it is normally not usable with offline messaging. Adding an offline messaging capability to a system |
- | =====Post-Compromise===== | + | In the case of something like encrypted email where archived messages almost always exist the benefit of forward secrecy is not worth the cost of the extra complexity. That is probably true for any end to end encrypted messaging application with an offline message delivery capability |
- | + | ||
- | If someone gains access to one of your private PGP encryption keys then they can then decrypt any intercepted email sent to the associated identity. If someone gains access to a private key associated with an identity used in a forward secrecy system then they only gain the ability to impersonate you. They still don't have access to shared keys you might negotiate with your correspondents so they can't decrypt passively intercepted messages. | + | |
- | + | ||
- | This only works for the case where the access is only a copy of your private key. If your opponent gets write access to your device they can probably leverage that into access to your messages going forward. Gaining access to a pass-phrase protected PGP private key requires at least enough access to install a key-logger (or equivalent) which implies write access. The ability to impersonate you would normally give them at least partial access to your discussions. | + | |
- | + | ||
- | A system providing forward secrecy has a theoretical advantage in this case, but in practice the advantage would likely be minimal. | + | |
- | + | ||
- | =====Pre-Compromise===== | + | |
- | + | ||
- | This assumes that there is someone with enough foresight (and [[starttls|ability]]) to record your encrypted messages off the network or your email server. That message archive can be decrypted if they later gain access to your PGP private key. That archive would have been useless in the case of a forward secrecy supporting system as the decryption key(s) would of been destroyed. | + | |
- | + | ||
- | This is the advantage of forward secrecy. | + | |
- | + | ||
- | =====Conclusions===== | + | |
- | + | ||
- | Forward secrecy: | + | |
- | + | ||
- | * provides no real protection after a compromise. | + | |
- | * provides no protection of archives. | + | |
- | * is rendered pointless for messages that are archived. | + | |
- | + | ||
- | The addition of forward secrecy to a protocol increases the complexity of that protocol. | + | |
[[pgpfan: | [[pgpfan: | ||
pgpfan/forward_secrecy.txt · Last modified: 2022/03/19 21:50 by b.walzer