em:qanalog
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| em:qanalog [2026/11/17 22:13] – corrected error led to rephrase b.walzer | em:qanalog [2026/11/18 15:39] (current) – [Some Arguments Directly Addressed] We should provide all the code. b.walzer | ||
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| //< | //< | ||
| - | Note that the interference tried to damage the transistor inputs by forcing the " | + | Note that the interference tried to damage the transistor inputs by forcing the " |
| I then copied the model files that represented the transistors and nerfed the transistors by reducing the gain by a factor of 10. Then I again determined what level of interference was required to cause a failure. The results: | I then copied the model files that represented the transistors and nerfed the transistors by reducing the gain by a factor of 10. Then I again determined what level of interference was required to cause a failure. The results: | ||
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| =====Shor' | =====Shor' | ||
| - | A Shor's computer critically depends on the properties of single atomic scale particles. When considering the feasibility of a Shor's computer, one aspect stands out. Single particles, and I can not emphasize this enough, do not and can not have gain. As a result, where conventional computing based on transistors is almost unimaginably robust and effective, computing based on single particles is almost unimaginably fragile and limited. | + | A Shor's computer critically depends on the properties of single atomic scale particles |
| A Shor's computer depends on the properties of single particles, but the properties of those particles also work to prevent the construction of a Shor's computer in the first place. | A Shor's computer depends on the properties of single particles, but the properties of those particles also work to prevent the construction of a Shor's computer in the first place. | ||
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| {{phase_binary.svg? | {{phase_binary.svg? | ||
| - | //< | + | //< |
| ... but it is common to suggest that the phase could be used in a more analog way. | ... but it is common to suggest that the phase could be used in a more analog way. | ||
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| That was boring old regular error correction. Quantum error correction is a radically different thing... | That was boring old regular error correction. Quantum error correction is a radically different thing... | ||
| - | Shor's is inherently analog. So you *do* have to consider the analog processes. Shor's can't do regeneration. So we can't actually " | + | Shor's is inherently analog. So you //do// have to consider the analog processes. Shor's can't do regeneration. So we can't actually " |
| Let's say we have manged to completely error correct the Shor's multiply/ | Let's say we have manged to completely error correct the Shor's multiply/ | ||
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| I can make a simple and definite statement here: | I can make a simple and definite statement here: | ||
| - | **Any claims before November 2026 of breaking RSA with a Shor's computer are fake.** | + | //Any claims before November 2026 of breaking RSA with a Shor's computer are fake.// |
| > | > | ||
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| ^Wager against Shor' | ^Wager against Shor' | ||
| - | The cost of the loss of efficiency and security is practically unbounded. The cost due to the risk of exposed secrets is finite and for most people is quite low. If you believe as I do, that the chance of a working Shor's computer is very low, then the decision is simple: you would avoid a transition to PQ cryptography. You would only consider the transition if you thought the chance of a working Shor's computer was significant. | + | The cost of the loss of efficiency and security is practically unbounded. The cost due to the risk of exposed secrets is finite and for most people is quite low. If you believe as I do, that the chance of a working Shor's computer is very low, then the decision is simple: you would avoid a transition to PQ cryptography. You would only consider the transition if you thought the chance of a working Shor's computer was significant. |
| - | " | + | " |
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| + | //The code for the examples can be found [[em: | ||
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| + | [[em: | ||
| + | [[:|Home]] | ||
em/qanalog.1794953582.txt.gz · Last modified: by b.walzer
