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| em:qanalog [2026/11/17 21:13] – created b.walzer | em:qanalog [2026/11/18 15:39] (current) – [Some Arguments Directly Addressed] We should provide all the code. b.walzer |
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| I have heard that things like Shor's computer are now in the realm of mere engineering. This then is my response from the perspective of computer/electronic design. Unfortunately providing context is going to require a fair bit of exposition. Sorry about that. It now seems clear that Grover's algorithm is not a threat to cryptography(([[https://words.filippo.io/128-bits/|Quantum Computers Are Not a Threat to 128-bit Symmetric Keys]])) so that leaves a Shor's computer as the //only// perceived threat. I will specifically be considering the threat from a Shor's computer against the particular bit of cryptography known as RSA2048. That does not mean that a Shor's computer intended to attack other forms of cryptography is feasible but I wanted a definite example. | I have heard that things like Shor's computer are now in the realm of mere engineering. This then is my response from the perspective of computer/electronic design. Unfortunately providing context is going to require a fair bit of exposition. Sorry about that. It now seems clear that Grover's algorithm is not a threat to cryptography(([[https://words.filippo.io/128-bits/|Quantum Computers Are Not a Threat to 128-bit Symmetric Keys]])) so that leaves a Shor's computer as the //only// perceived threat. I will specifically be considering the threat from a Shor's computer against the particular bit of cryptography known as RSA2048. That does not mean that a Shor's computer intended to attack other forms of cryptography is feasible but I wanted a definite example. |
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| You will not see the terms "quantum computer" or "qubit" outside of this paragraph as they beg the question I am addressing here by implying that such things could exist in some meaningful way. "Quantum computer" is a poor term anyway as it is used to distinguish from conventional computing. But conventional computing is based on the quantum [[wp>Field_effect_(semiconductor)|field effect]]. You want to see a quantum computer? Just pull out your phone. | You will not see the terms "quantum computer" or "qubit" outside of this paragraph as they beg the question I am addressing here by implying that such things could exist in some meaningful way. "Quantum computer" is a poor term anyway as it is intended to be something different from conventional computing. But conventional computing is based on the quantum [[wp>Field_effect_(semiconductor)|field effect]]. You want to see a quantum computer? Just pull out your phone. |
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| I confess that my understanding of the algorithm that would drive a Shor's computer is not complete. At some point in my research it became obvious that I was looking at what was probably the most unlikely proposal for a computing technology I had ever seen. The impracticality is nothing less than breathtaking. It did not seem to be worth my time to go further. | I confess that my understanding of the algorithm that would drive a Shor's computer is not complete. At some point in my research it became obvious that I was looking at what was probably the most unlikely proposal for a computing technology I had ever seen. The impracticality is nothing less than breathtaking. It did not seem to be worth my time to go further. |
| //<sub>BSS138 Absolute Maximum Ratings</sub>// | //<sub>BSS138 Absolute Maximum Ratings</sub>// |
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| The maximum current is 0.22 amp. That is considerably more than the 5.5 simulated amps. For that case, the datasheet says: "device functionality should not be assumed". The device model for the simulator, which came from the manufacturer of the transistor, assumed that the current would not exceed 0.22 amps. So what the simulator produced was pure fantasy. It looked pretty definite on the plot, but that plot was just nonsense. | The 5.5 amps of simulated current is 25 times greater than the maximum current listed on the datasheet (0.22 amps). For that case, the datasheet says: "device functionality should not be assumed". The device model for the simulator, which came from the manufacturer of the transistor, assumed that the current would not exceed 0.22 amps. So what the simulator produced was pure fantasy. It looked pretty definite on the plot, but that plot was just nonsense. |
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| The maximum power as specified by the datasheet is 0.36 Watts. The simulated power is 88 Watts. In electronics the sound of the smoke detector is often an indication of a breach of a physical limit. The simulator did not take into account the fact that the transistor would quickly transmorph into smoke and flame. | The maximum power as specified by the datasheet is 0.36 Watts. The simulated power is 88 Watts. In electronics the sound of the smoke detector is often an indication of a breach of a physical limit. The simulator did not take into account the fact that the transistor would quickly transmorph into smoke and flame. |
| //<sub>Simulated interference induced digital logic failure</sub>// | //<sub>Simulated interference induced digital logic failure</sub>// |
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| Note that the interference tried to damage the transistor inputs by forcing the "mid" signal out of the normal range of the circuit but only got up to 4V and down to -0.7V. That is because of an intrinsic side effect ([[wp>Power_MOSFET#Body_diode|(body diode]]) of how this type of transistor is made. This protection wasn't planned, we just got lucky ... and by "we" I mean everyone because this is a feature of contemporary digital logic. | Note that the interference tried to damage the transistor inputs by forcing the "mid" signal out of the normal range of the circuit but only got up to 4V and down to -0.7V. That is because of an intrinsic side effect ([[wp>Power_MOSFET#Body_diode|body diode]]) of how this type of transistor is made. This protection wasn't planned, we just got lucky ... and by "we" I mean everyone because this is a feature of contemporary digital logic. |
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| I then copied the model files that represented the transistors and nerfed the transistors by reducing the gain by a factor of 10. Then I again determined what level of interference was required to cause a failure. The results: | I then copied the model files that represented the transistors and nerfed the transistors by reducing the gain by a factor of 10. Then I again determined what level of interference was required to cause a failure. The results: |
| =====Shor's vs RSA2048===== | =====Shor's vs RSA2048===== |
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| A Shor's computer critically depends on the properties of single atomic scale particles. When considering the feasibility of a Shor's computer, one aspect stands out. Single particles, and I can not emphasize this enough, do not and can not have gain. As a result, where conventional computing based on transistors is almost unimaginably robust and effective, computing based on single particles is almost unimaginably fragile and limited. | A Shor's computer critically depends on the properties of single atomic scale particles (superposition and entanglement). When considering the feasibility of a Shor's computer, one aspect stands out. Single particles, and I can not emphasize this enough, do not and can not have gain due to the extreme fragility of the superposition and entanglement. As a result, where conventional computing based on transistors is almost unimaginably robust and effective, computing based on single particles is almost unimaginably fragile and limited. |
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| A Shor's computer depends on the properties of single particles, but the properties of those particles also work to prevent the construction of a Shor's computer in the first place. | A Shor's computer depends on the properties of single particles, but the properties of those particles also work to prevent the construction of a Shor's computer in the first place. |
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| {{phase_binary.svg?100}}\\ | {{phase_binary.svg?100}}\\ |
| //<sub>Binary phase convention (view looking down from the top of the sphere)</sub>// | //<sub>Binary phase convention (view looking down from the top of the sphere towards the 𝑥𝑦 plane)</sub>// |
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| ... but it is common to suggest that the phase could be used in a more analog way. | ... but it is common to suggest that the phase could be used in a more analog way. |
| That was boring old regular error correction. Quantum error correction is a radically different thing... | That was boring old regular error correction. Quantum error correction is a radically different thing... |
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| Shor's is inherently analog. So you *do* have to consider the analog processes. Shor's can't do regeneration. So we can't actually "correct" errors in the way that we can with gain based computing. Instead we have to somehow create a complete system with a lower chance of error at the end of processing. Oh, and we have to correct errors in phase as well. There have been many proposals for how to do this. Progress has been very slow. The point here is that applying error correction to a Shor's computer is much harder than to, say, a communications channel. The problem likely gets harder when you attempt to scale the system up. | Shor's is inherently analog. So you //do// have to consider the analog processes. Shor's can't do regeneration. So we can't actually "correct" errors in the way that we can with gain based computing. Instead we have to somehow create a complete system with a lower chance of error at the end of processing. Oh, and we have to correct errors in phase as well. There have been many proposals for how to do this. Progress has been very slow. The point here is that applying error correction to a Shor's computer is much harder than to, say, a communications channel. The problem likely gets harder when you attempt to scale the system up. |
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| Let's say we have manged to completely error correct the Shor's multiply/modulus step. Then we get to the next step of the process... | Let's say we have manged to completely error correct the Shor's multiply/modulus step. Then we get to the next step of the process... |
| >A Shor's computer has broken 15. | >A Shor's computer has broken 15. |
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| The idea that someone has broken the smallest possible RSA public key originally came from a paper called "Experimental realization of Shor's quantum factoring algorithm using nuclear magnetic resonance"([[https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0112176|Experimental realization of Shor's quantum factoring algorithm using nuclear magnetic resonance]])). That claim is fake(([[https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.7007|Pretending to factor large numbers on a quantum computer]])). It includes a "compilation" that reduced the problem to something trivially solvable with something completely unlike a Shor's computer (a single molecule consisting of 7 atoms). An actual Shor's computer to break 15 would at the very minimum require the interaction of thousands of particles(([[https://towardsdatascience.com/where-are-we-with-shors-algorithm/|Where Are We with Shor’s Algorithm?]])). | The idea that someone has broken the smallest possible RSA public key originally came from a paper called "Experimental realization of Shor's quantum factoring algorithm using nuclear magnetic resonance"(([[https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0112176|Experimental realization of Shor's quantum factoring algorithm using nuclear magnetic resonance]])). That claim is fake(([[https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.7007|Pretending to factor large numbers on a quantum computer]])). It includes a "compilation" that reduced the problem to something trivially solvable with something completely unlike a Shor's computer (a single molecule consisting of 7 atoms). An actual Shor's computer to break 15 would at the very minimum require the interaction of thousands of particles(([[https://towardsdatascience.com/where-are-we-with-shors-algorithm/|Where Are We with Shor’s Algorithm?]])). |
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| That paper may have inspired a whole series of fake claims. While the tortured logic can be a source of amusement(([[https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1237|Replication of Quantum Factorisation Records with an 8-bit Home Computer, an Abacus, and a Dog]])) that doesn't excuse the questionable ethics. There is an obligation to present the result of research so that it is not likely to be misunderstood. That is particularly true where the misunderstood result represents a danger to the general public. A public that would be under the false impression that a Shor's computer can exist and would only need to be scaled up to represent a threat to cryptography. | That paper may have inspired a whole series of fake claims. While the tortured logic can be a source of amusement(([[https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1237|Replication of Quantum Factorisation Records with an 8-bit Home Computer, an Abacus, and a Dog]])) that doesn't excuse the questionable ethics. There is an obligation to present the result of research so that it is not likely to be misunderstood. That is particularly true where the misunderstood result represents a danger to the general public. A public that would be under the false impression that a Shor's computer can exist and would only need to be scaled up to represent a threat to cryptography. |
| I can make a simple and definite statement here: | I can make a simple and definite statement here: |
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| **Any claims before November 2026 of breaking RSA with a Shor's computer are fake.** | //Any claims before November 2026 of breaking RSA with a Shor's computer are fake.// |
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| >Shor's capability will sharply accelerate like conventional digital computing did in the past. | >Shor's capability will sharply accelerate like conventional digital computing did in the past. |
| This makes me think of [[wp>Pascal's_wager|Pascal's wager]]. It involves a decision based on an unknowable factor: if a Shor's computer is possible or not. The wager decision would be to implement PQ encryption or not. If you choose to transition to PQ cryptography and Shor's never comes to be, then you will incur the cost of the extra complexity and loss of efficiency indefinitely. If you don't transition to PQ cryptography before the age of Shor's, then you incur the risk that an attacker had the motivation and the means to create the surreptitious archive and that the old secrets contained in the archive could harm you in some way. The decision table looks something like this: | This makes me think of [[wp>Pascal's_wager|Pascal's wager]]. It involves a decision based on an unknowable factor: if a Shor's computer is possible or not. The wager decision would be to implement PQ encryption or not. If you choose to transition to PQ cryptography and Shor's never comes to be, then you will incur the cost of the extra complexity and loss of efficiency indefinitely. If you don't transition to PQ cryptography before the age of Shor's, then you incur the risk that an attacker had the motivation and the means to create the surreptitious archive and that the old secrets contained in the archive could harm you in some way. The decision table looks something like this: |
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| ^ ^Shor's will exist ^Shor's will not exist ^ | | ^Shor's will exist ^Shor's will not exist ^ |
| |Wager for Shor's |status quo |loss of efficiency and security indefinitely| | ^Wager for Shor's |status quo |loss of efficiency and security indefinitely| |
| |Wager against Shor's|possible exposure of past secrets|status quo | | ^Wager against Shor's|possible exposure of past secrets|status quo | |
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| The cost of the loss of efficiency and security is practically unbounded. The cost due to the risk of exposed secrets is finite and for most people is quite low. If you believe as I do, that the chance of a working Shor's computer is very low, then the decision is simple: you would avoid a transition to PQ cryptography. You would only consider the transition if you thought the chance of a working Shor's computer was significant. | The cost of the loss of efficiency and security is practically unbounded. The cost due to the risk of exposed secrets is finite and for most people is quite low. If you believe as I do, that the chance of a working Shor's computer is very low, then the decision is simple: you would avoid a transition to PQ cryptography. You would only consider the transition if you thought the chance of a working Shor's computer was significant. |
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| "Harvest now, decrypt later" only applies to encryption. It does not apply to authentication. But yet there are PQ authentication methods mandated by the various national regulatory agencies. That would only make sense if there were some definite indication that a Shor's computer could actually be built. | "Harvest now, decrypt later" only applies to encryption. It does not apply to authentication. But yet there are PQ authentication methods mandated by the various national regulatory agencies. That would only make sense if there was some definite indication that a Shor's computer could actually be built. |
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| | //The code for the examples can be found [[em:qanalog_code|here]].// |
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